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∗

An array of new state policies and declining costs for clean
energy technologies have opened electricity markets to many new
participants, including electric utilities’ own customers. Most lowincome customers, however, lack the resources to access these
markets. Indeed, low-income customers already face
disproportionately high energy and transportation burdens.
Regulators and utilities have expressed concerns that these
burdens will only increase due to the loss of cross-subsidies
provided through traditional electricity rate structures. Rather
than develop effective strategies to protect low-income ratepayers
and facilitate their participation in clean energy markets, several
states have either enacted reactionary policies that disincentive all
customer classes from participating or pursue limited programs,
such as community solar programs, that will provide few benefits
to low-income households. This paper argues that states should
develop and fund comprehensive programs to ensure that lowincome households can participate in and benefit from the clean
energy transition.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The United States energy system is in the midst of profound
change. Renewable energy deployment has grown at an
unprecedented rate, and innovations in metering, storage, and
electric vehicle technology have spurred visions of a future energy
system without fossil fuels. 1 Although the United States trails
many other national governments in developing a forward-looking
energy policy2—and will likely fall much further behind under the
1

See, e.g., Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water,
and Sunlight (WWS) All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8
ENERGY
&
ENVTL.
SCI.
2093
(2015),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/USStatesWWS.pdf
(describing how the United States could obtain all of its energy needs from
wind, solar, and hydroelectric sources by 2050 using existing technologies).
2
Compare, e.g., THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, OUR FUTURE ENERGY 3 (2011),
https://stateofgreen.com/files/download/387 (setting a goal for Denmark to
obtain 100 percent of all energy supplies from renewable resources by 2015),
and Chloe Farand, Sweden Pledges to Cut All Greenhouse Gas Emissions by
2045,
THE
INDEP.
(Feb.
4,
2017,
1:50
PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/sweden-pledges-greenhouse-gasemissions-zero-2045-paris-agreement-a7561111.html (setting a similar carbonfree energy coal), with THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NATIONALLY
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Trump Administration 3 —an increasing number of states have
undertaken or explored bold initiatives to rapidly expand their
carbon-free energy systems.4 In Massachusetts, for example, the
2017 legislative docket included a proposed bill to transition the
state’s electricity and heating systems away from fossil resources
DETERMINED
CONTRIBUTION
(2016),
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20o
f%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf
(establishing an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
by twenty-six to twenty-eight percent below its 2005 level in 2025, but not
setting an express national renewable energy goal).
3
See, e.g., An America First Energy Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-energy (last visited Apr. 17, 2017)
(stating the Trump Administration will support shale oil, natural gas, and coal,
and making no mention of renewable resources or climate change); Earl J.
Ritchie, How Bad Will Donald Trump Be for Renewable Energy?, FORBES (Dec.
1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2016/12/01/how-bad-willdonald-trump-be-for-renewable-energy/2/#74a0adb52b6e (projecting that the
Trump Administration will enact policies favoring the oil industry and abandon
the Clean Power Plan, thereby slowing the growth of renewables). But see
Phuong Le, Washington Governor: Trump ‘Foolishness’ Won’t Affect Plans,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2017), reprinted in Phuong Le, Washington
Governor: Trump ‘Foolishness’ Won’t Affect Plans, SFGATE (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26/washington-governor-saysstate-wont-be-deterred-on/ (“Washington Gov. Jay Inslee said Thursday the
state will move forward with efforts to promote clean energy and tackle climate
change despite ‘foolishness’ from President Donald Trump.”); Ken Silverstein,
California Undercuts Trump’s Inauguration With Aggressive Carbon Reduction
Plan,
FORBES
(Jan.
21,
2017),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2017/01/21/california-undercutstrumps-debut-with-aggressive-carbon-cutting-plan/#7fcf54ed422b (“By 2050,
California hopes to have cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 80%.”).
4
For example, several states have increased their renewable portfolio
standards to require at least fifty percent of their electricity to come from
renewable resources. See, e.g., Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio
Standards and Goals, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 28,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx;
see also Robert Walton, New Mexico Lawmakers Propose Expanding RPS to
80% by 2040, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/newmexico-lawmakers-propose-expanding-rps-to-80-by-2040/435425/ (describing
state renewable portfolio standard increases). In addition, New York has
undertaken an effort to restructure its electricity system to accommodate
substantial increases in distributed energy resources. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB.
SERV., REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, No. 14-M-0101, at 51–52 (2014).
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and to halve the use of fossil fuels in the transportation system by
2050.5 Hawaii has led the nation in committing itself to a fossilfree electricity system by 2045, 6 and several other states have
enacted renewable portfolio standards that will increase their share
of renewable power to at least fifty percent by the middle of the
century, if not sooner.7 For a country in which coal-fired power
provided half of the nation’s electricity only a decade ago,8 the
ascendancy of renewable resources has been astounding.
The transition to renewable resources is also creating novel
economic opportunities for new participants in the energy market.9
While the historic model of electricity production and regulation in
the United States excluded all but a handful of designated
monopoly providers from profiting in the electricity sector, 10
thousands of companies and individuals now sell renewable

5

Robert Walton, Massachusetts Lawmakers Float Aggressive Bill Mandating
100%
Renewables
by
2035,
UTIL. DIVE
(Jan.
24,
2017),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/massachusetts-lawmakers-float-aggressivebill-mandating-100-renewables-by/434612/.
6
See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Ige Signs Bill Setting
100 Percent Renewable Energy Goal in Power Sector (June 8, 2015),
http://governor.hawaii.gov/newsroom/press-release-governor-ige-signs-billsetting-100-percent-renewable-energy-goal-in-power-sector; see also H.B. 623,
28th Leg. (Haw. 2015) (requiring an increase in renewable portfolio standards to
twenty-five percent by December 31, 2020, and 100 percent by December 31,
2040 and “[r]equir[ing] the Public Utilities Commission to include the impact of
renewable portfolio standards, if any, on the energy prices offered by renewable
energy developers and the cost of fossil fuel volatility in its renewable portfolio
standards study and report to the Legislature.”).
7
See Walton, supra note 5 (describing New Mexico’s proposal of eighty
percent renewable energy by 2040 fitting within Hawaii’s target of 100 percent
renewable energy by 2045 and California’s target of fifty percent renewable
energy by 2030).
8
Bruce Lieberman, Natural Gas and Wind are Supplanting Coal, YALE
CLIMATE
CONNECTIONS
(Jan.
1,
2017),
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/01/natural-gas-and-wind-aresupplanting-coal/.
9
See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY: ATTRACTING
INVESTMENT TO BUILD TOMORROW’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 23 (2015).
10
William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1614, 1629–31 (2014).
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electricity and other electricity services.11 Utilities’ own customers
have begun to play a larger role as providers of electricity
services. 12 State net metering laws and federal and state tax
incentives have played critical roles in incentivizing these new
participants to join the electricity market.13 Advanced metering and
communication technologies have also enabled utility customers to
earn revenue through demand response programs, which pay
customers for reducing their energy usage. 14 Electric vehicle
technology could create even more economic opportunities for
utility customers, who could receive payments for allowing their
car batteries to provide ancillary services to the grid.15 As laws and
technologies have advanced, an increasing number of utility
customers have begun to view the electricity system as a source of
revenue, rather than a mere source of essential services.16
Many low-income electricity customers, however, have few
viable opportunities to participate in these new electricity markets
or to otherwise benefit financially from the clean energy
transition. 17 To get access to the emerging “prosumer” energy
markets, utility customers must have the resources to invest in the
metering, storage, renewable generation, or demand response
11

See Elizabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a
Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (noting that
growth in solar development was enabled by private leasing models, rather than
utility deployment).
12
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677–78.
13
Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies
to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595
(2012); Inara Scott, Incentive Regulation, New Business Models, and the
Transformation of the Electric Power Industry, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L.
319, 354–55 (2016).
14
Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of
Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896–900 (2015) [hereinafter Jacobs,
Bypassing Federalism].
15
See Brian Lamble, Of Nesting Dolls and Trojan Horses: A Survey of Legal
and Policy Issues Attendant to Vehicle-to-Grid Battery Electric Vehicles, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 193 (2011).
16
See Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677–80 (discussing customers’ interests in
realizing the benefits of disruptive technologies).
17
See Adrienne L. Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers as the
Electricity System Evolves, 37 ENERGY L.J. 265, 267–68, 281 (2016).
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technologies that enable utility customers to serve as producers.18
Many low-income customers lack access to the necessary capital
or to the resources to procure, install, and deploy innovative energy
technology.19 Indeed, many low-income households already face
disproportionate energy and transportation burdens, and it is highly
unlikely that they will have access to the resources necessary to
enable them to build rooftop solar, buy electric vehicles, or install
smart meters.20 Without access to capital and services that could
enable streamlined installation of clean and smart energy facilities,
low-income customers will continue to be excluded from the
transitioning energy market.21
Utilities have argued that emerging energy markets tend to
provide disproportionate direct benefits to middle- and upperincome consumers.22 Some states have responded with thoughtful
programs to ensure access that is more inclusive. 23 Other
jurisdictions, however, have either embraced limited solutions,
such as community solar,24 which will likely not broadly expand
low-income participation in the clean energy economy, 25 or
18

INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, SHARED RENEWABLE ENERGY
FOR LOW- TO MODERATE-INCOME CONSUMERS: POLICY GUIDELINES AND
MODEL PROVISIONS 11–12 (2016).
19

Thompson, supra note 17, at 292.
Id. at 267–68, 281.
21
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 18 at 11–16.
22
Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 135–38 (2014-2015).
23
Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV. 25,
31–33 (2013) (describing several programs in California, in particular, while
noting that limited funding undermines several state programs). See also
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 18 at 8–9, 13, 18, 20,
22–24 (discussing programs in Colorado, California, and New York).
24
Community solar refers to a project through which multiple community
members receive electricity or financial benefits. DAVID FELDMAN ET AL.,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SHARED SOLAR: CURRENT LANDSCAPE,
MARKET POTENTIAL, AND THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 3
(2015), www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63892.pdf. In most cases, beneficiaries of
community solar buy “shares” of the solar project in exchange for receiving the
benefits. Id. at 8, 18, and 27 (discussing models of financing and participation).
25
See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. Although community solar
can provide opportunities for low-income households to participate in and
20
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adopted reactionary policies that tend to stifle all consumer
participation. For example, regulators have suspended net metering
programs, partly out of fear that net metering may unfairly impact
low-income ratepayers, although the economic impacts of net
metering are contested. 26 While net metering could shift costs
towards low-income ratepayers, or at least interfere with the crosssubsidies provided in most utility rate structures, if net metering
programs were more expansive 27 evidence suggests that net
metering could provide many benefits—in the form of pollution
receive benefits from solar power, many low-income ratepayers lack the
resources to buy shares of a community solar array. While states may require
community solar developers to obtain a minimum amount of participation from
low-income households, both the economic and the logistical hurdles associated
with recruiting participants and developing the solar arrays have impeded lowincome households’ participation in community solar projects. See LOTUS
ENGINEERING & SUSTAINABILITY, LLC, ANALYSIS OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE
LOW-INCOME
CARVE-OUT
FOR
COMMUNITY
SOLAR
SUBSCRIBER
ORGANIZATIONS
16–21
(2015),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/LowIncome%20Community%20Solar%20Report-CEO.pdf (evaluating Colorado’s
low-income solar program and identifying several programmatic hurdles).
26
See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya Carley, Emerging Shadows in
National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30
ELECTRICITY J. 33 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875878; Ari Peskoe,
Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly Discriminatory: Utility Rates and the
Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 211, 289–96
(2016) (describing the cost-shifting argument as a distraction and criticizing
regulatory responses); Benjamin Storrow, Is Nev. Poised to Change Course on
Net
Metering?,
CLIMATEWIRE
(Nov.
1,
2016),
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060045090/ (discussing Nevada,
the “poster child” for the debate on net metering); Rule, supra note 22
(explaining how utility companies claim that net metering is “unfair” and it has
a potential for “income-regressive” effects, but ultimately contests these
claims).
27
See Thompson, supra note 17, at 282–85 (describing how rate design
traditional created cross-subsidization between ratepayer classes); Jon
Wellinghoff & James Tong, Wellinghoff and Tong: A Common Confusion Over
Net Metering is Undermining Utilities and the Grid: ‘Cost-Shifting’ and ‘Not
Paying Your Fair Share’ are Not the Same Thing, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/wellinghoff-and-tong-a-common-confusionover-net-metering-is-undermining-u/355388/ (explaining how net metering may
interfere with the cross-subsidies). But see Peskoe, supra note 26 (stating the
cost-shifting claims are overblown).
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reduction, deferred investment in new infrastructure, and ancillary
services 28 —to all ratepayers, including low-income ones. 29
Nonetheless, several regulators have imposed restrictions on net
metering that seem counter-productive.30 Most jurisdictions have
failed to develop a strategy for ensuring that low-income
consumers can participate in and benefit from the changing energy
markets.
To address these shortcomings, this paper recommends a more
deliberative approach to providing low-income communities better
access to the emerging clean energy economy. First, this paper
recommends that states develop strategies that would apply
statewide, citywide, or at the utility level to ensure that low-income
communities are integrated into the energy transition underway.
Second, once a plan is in place, states should assign specific
organizations
responsibility
for
providing
low-income
communities resources, services, and access to the clean energy
economy. Third, to facilitate this access, states should provide
financial resources for the low-income energy service providers to
purchase equipment in bulk and install resources in a strategic
manner that will lower soft costs. Finally, states should also ensure
sustained funding for programs that will enable low-income
households to be continuous participants in, and beneficiaries of,
the ongoing energy transition.
28

“Ancillary services maintain electric reliability and support the transmission
of electricity.” FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENERGY PRIMER:
A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS, at 55 (2015),
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf.
29
Rule, supra note 22, at 137–38 (arguing that net metering and other utility
policies that promote renewable energy development may mitigate
disproportionate impacts that low-income communities face due to their
proximity to polluting energy sources); Davies & Carley, supra note 26, at 5–7
(explaining how Nevada regulators disregarded a study showing that net
metering would bring grid-wide benefits and lower costs); Peskoe, supra note
26, at 277 (discussing multiple benefits).
30
Rule, supra note 22, at 138 (stating that reforming net metering on account
of wealth distribution impacts is generally inefficient and undesirable); Peskoe,
supra note 26 at 277–98 (arguing that the focus on cross-subsidization is
misdirected and that policy reforms that stifle distributed solar development,
such as net metering limitations, undermine competition and necessary reforms
in the electricity system).
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Part II of this paper provides a short overview of the current
state and federal policies and the technological innovations that
have enabled energy consumers to become electricity service
providers. Part II also explores ways in which electricity markets
may continue to evolve and create increasing opportunities for
electricity prosumers. Part III describes some of the risks that the
evolving electricity system presents to low-income consumers who
already face an undue energy and transportation burden. As this
part describes, some policymakers have recognized these risks and
pursued progressive policies to provide low-income households
access to clean energy resources. Other regulators, however, have
responded to low-income needs by pursuing regressive policies
that will stifle continued development of a clean energy system.
Part IV argues for a more comprehensive set of measures that will
enable low-income households to be part of a more inclusive
energy transition through planning, designated low-income energy
providers, and access to affordable clean energy systems. Finally,
Part V concludes that a more inclusive energy transition is feasible,
but will require planning and strategy to succeed.
II.

RENEWABLE ENERGY REGULATION, INNOVATION, AND
THE RISE OF “PROSUMERS”
For the past several years, the energy system has been in the
midst of disruption as renewable energy technologies and state and
federal policies have made a transition away from fossil fuels
increasingly viable.31 These technologies and policies have also
altered customers’ relationships with the energy system. 32
Although utilities continue to supply the vast majority of energy
services in the United States, a growing number of energy
consumers today produce energy as well. Multiple factors have led
to the rise of energy prosumers, including state and federal policies
that encourage utility customers to generate their own power and
reduce consumption on demand and technological innovations that
31

See Boyd, supra note 10 (discussing customers’ interests in realizing the
benefits of disruptive technologies).
32
Id. (discussing customers’ interests in realizing the benefits of disruptive
technologies).
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have enabled much broader participation in energy markets at
much lower costs.33 As technologies for energy storage and electric
vehicles continue to improve and costs come down, it seems likely
that even more prosumers will seek participation in a dynamic
energy system. 34 This section will highlight the key laws and
technological innovations that have enabled and will likely
accelerate changes in energy markets.
A. Generation
Electricity generation was once considered the near-exclusive
domain of large utility providers.35 The central power station model
embraced by U.S. electricity regulators and utilities allowed a
small number of utilities to own and operate each component of
the electricity system—from generation to distribution—through
vertically integrated monopolies.36 For nearly one hundred years,
electricity service was a one-way transaction from utilities to
consumers.37
The passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(“PURPA”)38 in 1978, followed by the enactment of the nation’s
first net metering programs in the early 1980s,39 began to change
the electricity system. PURPA opened electricity generation to

33

Graffy & Kihm, supra note 11, at 5–6 (discussing declining costs of solar
and wind power technologies and the proliferation of the state renewable
portfolio standards); Sharon Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q.
519, 527, 531–32, 534 (2016) [hereinafter Jacobs, Energy Prosumer]
(discussing declining costs of solar and storage and policies that support demand
response and net metering).
34
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1699–1701.
35
Id. at 1628–29.
36
Id. at 1629–30.
37
Id. at 1628–30; see Amy Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV.
887, 907–09 (2016).
38
Pub. L. No. 95–617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)).
39
See Harvey L. Reiter & William Greene, The Case for Reforming Net
Metering Compensation: Why Regulators and Courts Should Reject the Public
Policy and Antitrust Arguments for Preserving the Status Quo, 37 Energy L.J.
373, 376 (2016) (tracing net metering tariffs to 1980 and stating that the first net
metering law was passed in 1983).
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new providers.40 It also allowed cogeneration facilities that were
customers of the utilities to sell their excess power production to
the utilities,41 creating the first class of utility “prosumers.” Net
metering laws expanded the opportunities for prosumers by
allowing utility customers to pay only for their net energy usage,
measured by discounting the amount of energy customers
delivered to the utility from the amount they received.42 Customers
that were able to produce their own electricity through wind, solar,
and other designated sources could thereby avoid paying for each
unit of electricity delivered by the utility to the customers. 43
Although this incentive did not immediately spur significant
interest in renewable energy development by utility customers, it
paved the way for the future prosumer movement.
In the 2000s, net metering—in combination with federal tax
credits, state renewable portfolio standards, and state subsidies—
finally spurred a notable uptick in renewable energy production by
utilities’ customers.44 Since then, rapid technological advances and
mass production of solar panels have allowed hardware costs for
solar arrays to drop substantially.45 The combination of lower costs
and subsidies has also opened solar development to third-party
solar providers, who rely on net metering to make solar more
affordable for customers, shared by both the third parties and
utilities.46 Net metering thus became a critical tool in promoting
rooftop and distributed solar development.47 Indeed, net metering
became such an important incentive that the utilities’ trade
association, the Edison Electric Institute, warned it could lead to a
utility death spiral if increasing numbers of utility customers
40

Joe Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L.
435, 451 (2002).
41
Id.
42
Rule, supra note 22, at 118.
43
See id.
44
Sanya Carley, The Era of State Energy Policy Innovation: A Review of
Policy Instruments, 28 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 265, 273–75 (2011).
45
Jacobs, Energy Prosumer, supra note 33, at 527.
46
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677; JASON COUGHLIN ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SOLAR: UTILITY, PRIVATE, AND NON-PROFIT
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 3 (2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49930.pdf.
47
Rule, supra note 22, at 118.
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became energy producers.48 While reports of utilities’ deaths may
be exaggerated, there is little dispute that net metering has stirred
concerns about the viability of the traditional utility business
model.49
B. Demand Response
As with customer generation of electricity, demand response
programs date back to at least the 1970s, but have recently become
more popular for utility customers as new technologies and
payment structures have developed.50 Demand response programs
are simple in concept; they either charge electricity customers
higher rates during peak periods to incentivize load reduction or
they pay electricity consumers directly to reduce their load upon
request. 51 Demand response programs have grown in size and
scope, and demand response providers (that is, utilities’ customers)
may now receive incentive payments in both retail and wholesale
markets. 52 What’s more, through programs developed by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and regional
transmission operators, particularly the Pennsylvania, Jersey,
Maryland Power Pool (“PJM”) Interconnection, demand response
providers may now bid demand response into separate energy,
capacity, and ancillary service markets. 53 With the Supreme
Court’s blessing of wholesale demand response programs,54 and
increased interest by many utility customers seeking to benefit
from participating in demand response programs, demand response
is on the cusp of becoming another major energy service provided
by utilities’ own customers.55

48

Peter Kind, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC
BUSINESS
3–5
(2013),
http://
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.
49
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677.
50
Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism, supra note 14, at 895–900.
51
Id. at 897.
52
Id. at 897–98.
53
Id. at 927.
54
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
55
Stein, supra note 37, at 926–30.
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Technological innovations have opened demand response
programs to many more participants who can decrease their load
through small changes in electricity use.56 Historically, only large
customers had the capacity to implement demand response.
However, smart energy meters and digital communication systems
now allow utilities to communicate with an array of electrical
devices, including residential hot water heaters and air
conditioners.57 This communication allows utilities to make subtle
adjustments in the appliances’ operations and related power
consumption. 58 In exchange for allowing utilities such access,
utilities’ customers may receive payments for participating in
demand response.59 On a much larger scale, third-party demand
response aggregators may now bid into competitive wholesale
markets to attempt to lower system-wide energy use and market
clearing prices during peak consumption periods. 60 If the
aggregated demand response bid clears the market, retail sales of
power will drop for utilities that would otherwise serve that load.
While these innovations will help maintain overall grid reliability
and lower prices, they reduce utilities’ overall sales and could, like
net metering, have disruptive impacts on the utilities’ business
model.
C. Storage and Electric Vehicles
Although electricity storage and the integration of electric
vehicles into a dynamic electricity grid are in early stages,
improved technologies and lower costs make it likely that many
utility customers will soon be able to sell new grid management
services to electric utilities. As the costs of storage technologies
decline, residential ratepayers will be able to provide more
ancillary services for themselves and the grid.61 Electric vehicles
56
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could help ensure that wind power produced at night can be put to
good use or stored for use during daylight and peak periods, when
energy prices are higher. 62 When combined with smart
communication devices, electric vehicle charging programs could
enable vehicle owners to charge their batteries when prices are low
or to even be paid when they take power from the grid during
“oversupply” periods when generation exceeds load.63 As storage
and electric vehicle technologies improve, it is only a matter of
time before enterprising third parties or energy regulators create
new payment structures that will incentivize utility customers to
become storage and grid management service providers.
D. The Multiple Economic Benefits to Clean Energy Market
Participants
Utility customers who participate in net metering, demand
response, or emerging storage and ancillary service programs
receive several economic benefits. First, and most obviously, they
receive payments from the utilities (and thus other utility
customers) whenever they provide the desired electricity service.
Although direct payments for some services can be relatively low,
they can amount to meaningful economic benefits when combined
with subsidies and other compensatory systems. Net metering, for
example, effectively allows participants to receive some retail
electricity service for free or at deep discounts.64 Although net
metering participants must make initial investments in solar arrays
or batteries, federal and state tax credits offset some of the upfront
price and provide a shorter payback period for net metering
customers.65 Demand response operates under a similar design, in
that participants who enroll in demand response programs may
have to make initial investments in smart meters, but they then
62

Lamble, supra note 15, at 198–204. But see Stein, supra note 37, at 934
(noting that vehicle owners may not always be willing to provide grid
management services if personal vehicle needs outweigh the benefits provided
by a utility).
63
Lamble, supra note 15, at 198–204.
64
Scott, supra note 13, at 355.
65
Powers, supra note 13, at 638–39. Kayci G. Hines, Solar Shift: An Analysis
of the Federal Income Tax Issues Associated with the Residential Value of Solar
Tariff, 5 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y 388, 390 (2015).

554

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

benefit both by paying less for retail power consumption and by
receiving payments for their negawatts. 66 Storage and electric
vehicle integration programs will presumably operate similarly.
Thus, new energy markets create economic incentives for those
who have the capital to invest in the technology necessary to
participate in these markets.
Beyond those direct incentives, participation in clean energy
programs usually creates attendant benefits, including higher
property values, local jobs, and improved air quality.67 According
to the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, rooftop solar increases
property values. 68 Electric vehicle advocates argue that vehicle
charging stations have a similar economic benefit, at least for
commercial properties. 69 Both solar arrays and electric vehicle
charging systems are signs of affluence, and they could thereby
increase values of the specific properties on which they are
located, as well as neighborhood property values.70 Installation of
distributed resources could also bring jobs to low-income
neighborhoods.71 Finally, electric vehicles also provide direct air
quality benefits by eliminating emissions from vehicles run on
fossil fuels.72 While the direct air pollution benefits of distributed
solar depend on whether solar arrays are offsetting localized
emissions, distributed solar could also improve air quality.73 Since
participation in clean energy programs requires an initial outlay of
capital, however, many low-income communities receive none of
the direct and attendant benefits clean energy programs offer. The
next section explores this dynamic.
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III.
THE RISK OF AN UNJUST ENERGY TRANSITION
Many low-income electricity customers have few viable
opportunities to participate in clean electricity markets or to
otherwise benefit financially from the clean energy transition.74 To
access the emerging clean energy markets, utility customers must
have the resources to invest in the metering, storage, renewable
generation, or demand response technologies that enable utility
customers to serve as producers.75 Many low-income customers,
however, lack access to necessary capital or the resources to
procure, install, and deploy innovative energy technology. 76
Indeed,
many
low-income
households
already
face
77
disproportionate energy and transportation burdens, and it is
highly unlikely that they will have access to the resources
necessary to enable them to build rooftop solar, buy electric
vehicles, or install smart meters. Without access to capital and
services that could enable streamlined installation of clean and
smart energy facilities, low-income customers will continue to be
left out of the transitioning energy market.
Recognizing these risks, some regulators have responded to the
potential disproportionate impacts of the prosumer movement by
embracing community solar as a tool to increase low-income
access to renewable resources.78 Other regulators have responded
to concerns about disproportionate effects by eliminating net
metering programs or imposing extremely high net metering
participation charges. 79 Neither approach is adequate. While
community solar programs allow increased access to clean energy
74
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systems, they are unlikely to provide benefits to large numbers of
low-income communities. Eliminating clean energy programs in
the name of low-income communities is a cynical strategy that
only deprives low-income households of access to clean energy
benefits. Smarter strategies are necessary to enable low-income
households to benefit from the current energy transition.
Otherwise, households and communities with high energy and
transportation burdens may remain trapped in an electricity system
that has failed to protect them from energy insecurity or to help lift
them out of poverty.
A. Low-Income Energy and Transportation Burdens
Low-income communities and households in the United States
face a higher energy and transportation burden than their middleand upper-income counterparts.80 The terms “energy burden” and
“transportation burden” refer to the percentages of a household’s
income spent on energy and transportation.81 As the wealth gap in
the United States has grown, so has the disproportionate energy
and transportation burden borne by low-income households.82
In comparison to middle- and upper-income ratepayers, who
spend 1-5% of their annual income on household heat and energy,
low-income ratepayers spend 6-30%.83 According to a 2016 survey
by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
(“ACEEE”), in metropolitan areas alone, the median low-income
household’s energy burden was 7.4%, but some cities had lowincome residents with energy burdens as high as 25%. 84 In
80
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comparison, the median energy burden for higher income
households was about 2.3%.85
Low-income
households
also
face
disproportionate
transportation costs.86 In comparison to middle- and upper-income
households, who spent 11.2% and 8.2%, respectively, on
transportation in 2014, low-income households spent 15.7%.87 This
percentage represented a significant increase over prior years,
when low-income transportation expenditures accounted for 9.510.5% of household income.88 Higher gasoline expenditures are the
primary cause of the increased transportation burden.89 If gasoline
prices spike, low-income communities will be particularly hard hit.
High energy and transportation burdens account for only some
of the problems facing low-income households. According to The
Pew Charitable Trusts, low-income households had much less
financial slack in their budgets in 2014 in comparison to 2004.90
Indeed, the median low-income household in 2014 had an income
shortfall of approximately $2,400, indicating that low-income
households were going into debt to meet basic living expenses.91
Quite obviously, low-income households have little-to-no
capacity to make the upfront investments in solar arrays, smart
meters, or electric vehicles to participate in the growing clean
energy markets.92 So long as access to capital is a condition of
participation in these markets, low-income communities will be
left behind. To address these concerns, regulators have pursued
various strategies that include curtailing clean energy incentive
programs for middle- and upper-income ratepayers and expanding
access to clean energy resources through community solar
programs.93 As the next two sections indicate, neither approach has
worked very well. However, more holistic solutions pursued by
85
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some states, as described in Part IV, could provide much better
results.
B. Death Spirals and Regulatory Overreactions
Interest in low-income access to clean energy programs has
increased substantially as participation in net metering has grown.
Electric utilities and some regulators fear that net metering could
substantially reduce the revenues utilities collect from higherincome customers who have the ability to invest in solar arrays and
other clean energy technology.94 Under traditional electricity rate
design, wealthier customers typically pay higher rates that are
designed to subsidize low-income energy assistance programs.95
Net metering threatens to undo some of this cross-subsidization,
however, because it incentivizes ratepayers with high rates to
install solar arrays and offset some amount of their retail electricity
consumption. 96 In places where customers also pay time-of-use
rates, net metering creates an even greater incentive for them to
defect from the utility by producing solar power during peak
periods.97 If enough customers who have the ability to pay for solar
arrays participate in net metering, utilities fear that costs for nonparticipants will have to rise. 98 Higher rates will increase the
incentives for another wave of customer participation in net
metering and lead to more price hikes for non-participants.99 If the
cycle continues, a death spiral could result, in which only lowincome customers are left without an ability to pay for utility
services.
Although claims that net metering may erode crosssubsidization and lead to a death spiral are likely overblown, and
although net metering caps and price adjustments have already
minimized the risk of a death spiral caused by net metering, 100
regulators in some states have used concerns about the
94
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disproportionate impacts of net metering on low-income ratepayers
to justify the evisceration of net metering programs. In Nevada, for
example, the state public utility commission (“PUC”) effectively
eliminated net metering by (1) requiring all net metering
participants to pay a monthly fixed cost that will be approximately
three times the fixed costs for non-participants and (2) reducing the
payments net metering customers receive for the electricity they
sell to utilities by about 80 percent.101 To justify its decision, the
Nevada PUC relied on utility cost estimates that indicated that net
metering was creating an unfair subsidy for net metering customers
at the expense of other ratepayers. 102 The PUC also rejected
independent analyses that showed that net metering was providing
grid-wide benefits for all customers. 103 From the PUC’s
perspective, only a few privileged customers were benefitting from
net metering at the expense of less-privileged ones.104 To avoid this
seemingly unfair result, the Nevada PUC effectively eliminated net
metering in the state.
While the PUC’s decision may have been motivated by a desire
to protect low-income ratepayers from price spikes, the PUC never
considered ways in which a different regulatory or pricing
structure could provide new benefits to low-income participants. In
the traditional utility rate design model, low-income customers
may benefit from reduced rates, but they rarely benefit from
programs that are designed to provide new opportunities and
access to new markets. The PUC’s decision reflects this approach.
Indeed, by eliminating net metering in the state, the decision
weakened Nevada’s clean energy market and the benefits it could
provide to ratepayers of all economic levels.105
C. Community Solar to the Rescue?
On the other end of the spectrum, low-income and renewable
energy advocates have sought to expand access to renewable
101
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energy benefits through community solar programs.106 Community
solar has multiple meanings, but it frequently refers to a program
in which participants can buy or receive “shares” of an offsite solar
array in exchange for receiving electricity from that array. 107
Participants then use the solar power to offset their retail electricity
consumption through a virtual net metering transaction. Since
funding for the community solar array comes from multiple
participants—and is frequently provided or supplemented by
subsidies, grants, and donations—community solar potentially
provides opportunities for low-income households to participate in
and benefit from clean energy development and markets.108
Community solar may provide several benefits to low-income
communities, but broad access to the evolving energy markets is
unlikely to be one of them. Community solar projects may help
raise neighborhood property values and potentially attract other
clean energy projects into the neighborhood.109 If these projects
reduce the use of fossil fuels in the neighborhood, the community
at large will benefit from improved air quality. However, to the
extent community solar is seen as a way to provide direct
economic benefits to low-income households, most community
solar programs fall short. The majority are not focused on
providing low-income access to lucrative energy markets, and
programs with low-income carve-outs face many impediments.110
Even if programs successfully attract substantial participation from
low-income households, this will not necessarily yield direct
financial benefits for these participants; depending on the size of
the solar array and the number of participants, the division of the
net metering rights into distinct shares may substantially diminish
the value of net metering for each individual participant. Thus,
while community solar may enable some low-income households
to participate in a limited clean energy program, community solar
106
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is not on its own an effective strategy for expanding new energy
markets to low-income communities.
And yet, as tepid a program as community solar may be, it
represents one of the only common strategies aimed at actually
expanding clean energy markets and benefits to low-income
communities. Very few programs consider strategies to increase
low-income access to energy storage, electric vehicles, or demand
response programs. This is in part because these technologies and
the markets to support them are just developing. In addition, the
financial resources necessary to provide low-income access to
these clean energy systems are significant. Without a plan to
expand access, however, low-income households will remain
vulnerable to increasing energy and transportation burdens, even as
wealthier ratepayers learn how to profit from the clean energy
transition.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE ENERGY
TRANSITION
Expanding low-income access to a clean energy system will
require the development of a strategy, designation of low-income
clean energy providers, bulk purchase and deployment projects,
and sustained funding for low-income programs. Rather than view
low-income households as perpetual recipients of lifeline rates,
state planners and renewable energy advocates should begin to
envision a future energy system in which low-income households
are no longer reliant on expensive fuels and cross-subsidization
through rate design. With the right plan and implementation
strategy, low-income households can become equal and productive
participants in a clean energy transition. This section briefly
sketches out the key steps to developing a more inclusive energy
transition.
First, states must develop plans based on the idea that clean and
advanced energy technologies will displace fossil fuel resources in
all communities. Until regulators and planners embrace a transition
to 100% clean energy, they will not have the capacity to envision
equitable access to clean energy resources. Once they do envision
an inclusive transition, state regulators must then develop a
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strategy for prioritizing low-income acquisition of clean energy
technologies and systems. Much as a state might design its longterm transportation or land use strategies, an inclusive energy
transition strategy would establish end goals, identify the strategies
and tactics to achieve those goals, identify potential obstacles and
tactics to overcome them, and establish clear, enforceable steps to
implement the strategy.
Second, states should establish or designate specific providers
who will provide low-income households and communities clean
energy services.111 States may assign this role to existing utilities,
state agencies, non-profit organizations, or other entities that have
the skill and capacity to provide specialized services to lowincome communities. Third-party organizations may be best suited
to this task, as some existing models demonstrate. In California,
for example, the non-profit organization GRID Alternatives has a
contract with the state to provide rooftop solar development to
low-income communities.112 Not only has this model successfully
increased low-income solar access, it has also lowered
participants’ monthly electricity bills by approximately 80
percent.113 In Washington, D.C., city leaders created a separate
utility, the D.C. Sustainable Energy Utility, to administer an
Affordable Solar Program and install rooftop solar on homes
owned by low-income residents.114 In 2012, the program helped
install nearly ninety rooftop arrays. 115 In 2015, the Sustainable
Energy Utility installed 137 solar arrays on low-income houses,
accounting for thirty percent of all solar deployment in
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Washington, D.C. 116 The successes of these third-party
organizations indicate that low-income households may benefit
from this third-party model. Alternatively, if states assign existing
utilities the role of providing clean energy services to low-income
communities, states should create clear regulatory requirements
and oversight protocols to ensure that utilities are meeting
expectations. As the data on energy burdens illustrate,117 the utility
system has not always served low-income communities effectively,
and utilities should receive authorization to provide low-income
clean energy services only if the utilities can deliver. Whichever
model the state employs, it should make sure that low-income
providers have adequate training and capacity to deliver clean
energy services to low-income markets.
Third, states should finance bulk purchasing and deployment
projects to reduce equipment and soft costs. 118 Replacing
traditional energy sources, gasoline-powered vehicles, and
outdated appliances with the equipment necessary to enable an
inclusive energy transition will be an expensive endeavor. It will
also take significant development resources. States can minimize
these costs through bulk purchasing programs and strategic
development programs that take advantage of economies of
scale.119 States should enact laws that require any new homes and
buildings that receive low-income financial assistance to be built
with solar arrays, smart meters, and electric vehicle charges
already in place.120 This will rapidly accelerate low-income access
to this hardware and reduce installation and permitting expenses
associated with retrofits.
116
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Finally, states should create and support a dedicated lowincome program to provide consistent resources to support an
inclusive energy transition. Many low-income energy assistance
programs provide intermittent and inadequate resources.121 Without
adequate and sustained funding, staffing, and other resources, lowincome households will not have the capacity to participate in the
energy transition. State planners should therefore develop
programs that ensure steady access to capital and other necessary
resources.

V.
CONCLUSION
The transition to a clean energy system threatens to leave lowincome communities, who already face disproportionate energy
and transportation burdens, further behind. To avoid this outcome,
regulators should begin planning for a comprehensive and
inclusive energy transition. Not only will a strategic approach help
ensure that low-income communities have priority access to clean
energy technologies, it will also accelerate the country’s transition
to carbon-free energy sources.
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